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 ABSTRACT 
EVALUATING THE PERFORMANCE OF THE DISTRIBUTION OF INTERNATIONAL 
GRANTS AFTER 2003 IN IRAQ 
By 
AL-NIDAWI, Ali Mahmood Salman  
 
     The international aids are grants provided by rich countries to poor countries, or countries 
that need to international assistance temporary, taking into account the conditions of 
humanitarian, security, economic and social. 
After 2003, Iraq has become one of the countries that need urgent international assistance to 
address the humanitarian and economic situation due to the wrong policies of the former 
regime, wars, embargo that caused the collapse of most of the country’s infrastructure, as well 
as invasion of the multinational forces led by the United States of America that brought a 
catastrophic destruction to the remains of the country’s infrastructure.  
The United States of America and its partners during the Madrid Conference 2003 have 
agreed to restore the destroyed infrastructure. This study will aims at evaluating the 
performance of international assistance in Iraq, according to its policies. Therefore, the 
question might be posed is: where did the money to rebuild Iraq go? How the money of 
infrastructure reconstructing is distributed? What are the main leakages that contribute to lose 
the money? How much the gap between the money disbursed for infrastructure reconstructing 
and the result of this process? Does it achieve its objectives? What are the policies that 
promote maintain or protect the public fund in the future?   
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DEFINITION OF TERMS AND ACRONYMS 
 
 NGOs ………………………………Non-Government Organizations  
 INGOs ……………………………...International Non-Government Organizations 
 UNDG ……………………………...United Nations Development Group  
 IMF………………………………….International Monetary Fund  
 UNCTAD …………………………..United Nations Conference for Trade and Development 
 WB …………………………………World Bank 
 IRFFI ……………………………….International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq 
 UN ………………………………….United Nations 
 U.S.A ……………………………….United States of America 
 EU…………………………………...European Union 
 USAID………………………………United States Agency for International Development 
 CPA …………………………………Coalition Provisional Authority 
 ODA ………………………………....Official Development Aid  
 DAD …………………………………Development Assistance Database  
 SIGIR ………………………………...Special General for Iraq Reconstruction  
 IG ……………………………………..Inspector General 
 IAMB …………………………………International Advisory and Monitoring Board 
 ISRB.......................................................Iraqi Strategic Review Board  
 TFF ……………………………………Trust Fund Facility 
 ICRC…………………………………...International Committee of the Red Cross 
 UNICEF ……………………………….United Nations Children's Fund    
 UNDP………………………………….United Nations Development Program 
  
iii 
TABLE OF CONTENTS 
 
 
ABSTRACT……………………….…………………………………………………….…...IV 
ACKNOWLEDGEMENTS......................................................................................................V  
ACRONYMS AND ABBREVIATIONS………………………………………………........VI 
LIST OF TABLES……………………………………………………………………..…….IX 
 
I. INTRODUCTION………………………………….……………………………………...1 
 
1. The Problem Statement………………………………………………………….1-8  
2. The Purpose of the Study..........................................................................................8 
3. Significance of this Study…………………………………………………….……9 
4. The Sources of Data………………………………………………………..………9 
5. Limitations of the Study…………………………………………………………..10 
 
II. ISSUE BACKGROUND…………………………………………………………….11-12 
 
III. THE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT FUND...........................................13-15 
  
IV. FAILURES OF THE RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS…………………………......16  
 
1. Administrative Fragmentations…………………………………………………...16 
2. Inefficient Administrative all Levels.................................................................16-17 
3. Mismanagement and Corruption……………………………………………........17 
4. Lack of Security and Political Instability…………………………………………18 
 
V. ADMINISTRATION OF THE RECONSTRUCTION FUND……………………...…19  
1. The Grants Distribution According to the Sectors…………………………….19-26 
  
iv 
 
VI. SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE RECONSTRUCTION 
(FINDINGS)……………………………………………………………………………..27-28  
 
First, Security Instability.......................................................................................28-30 
Second, Under Coordinated: (Proliferation and Fragmentation of Donor Aid)…30-32 
Three, Mismanagement and Corruption…………………………………………33-35 
Four, Inefficient Administrative all Levels............................................................35-37 
 
VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION……………………………………………..…….38 
 
Summary……………………………………………………………………………38 
Conclusion……………………………………………………………………….39-40 
 
VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND URGENT NEEDS………………………...……41-42 
VIII. REFERENCES……………………………………………………………………43-44 
 
 
 
 
 
  
v 
vi 
LIST OF TABLES 
 
Table 1: Donor pledged to help Reconstruct Iraq Infrastructure at the Madrid Conference, 
2003..........................................................................................................................................14  
Table 2: The Distribution of projects funded by donor countries............................................21   
Table 3: The projects financed by the (WB and UN) for the reconstruction...........................21 
Table 4: The Distribution of projects funded by (WB and UN) for the reconstruction...........22 
Table 5: Total expenditure for projects funded by the United Nations Fund for reconstruction 
(UNDG-ITF) by sector (U.S. $) for the years (2004 -2009)………………………………....23  
Table 6: Distribution of assistance the World Bank's Fund for the reconstruction of Iraq by 
major sectors…………………………………………………………………………………24 
Table 7: shows the contributions to eight major donor states, which represent 79% of the total 
international aid, except the U.S.A fund……………………………………………………..25 
Table 8: shows the amounts allocated and spent in U.S dollars for each sector…………….26 
Table 9: Shows the number of worker deaths in each quarter starting with the first reporting 
by (SIGIR)……………………………………………………………………………………29 
Table 10: Shows the changes that occurred in allocations…………………………..……….32
I. INTRODUCTION 
1. The Problem Statement 
     Iraq is the cradle of one of the old civilizations of the Sumerian and Babylonian these 
related to five thousand years ago. Large resources, good and fine infrastructure, it is to be 
compared to its neighbors during the seventies of the last century.  
But wrong policies, continuing wars, and international embargo have caused the collapse of 
most of the country’s infrastructure.  
The last invasion of the multinational forces led by the United States of America brought a 
catastrophic destruction to the remains of the country’s infrastructure.  
The United States of America and its partners, the United Nations (UN), the World Bank, and 
later the Iraqi Government have agreed to restore the destroyed infrastructure. During the 
Madrid Conference 2003 they established the International Reconstruction Fund for Iraq 
(IRFFI). It was supposed to be administered jointly by the World Bank and United Nations 
Development Group (UNDG) in coordination with the Iraqi authorities and the donor nation.1  
The pledges totaled some $32 billion after 2003–2009 which were to be channeled through 
the Trust Fund.2 
     The serious question is "What has achieved in rebuilding the Iraqi infrastructures?” As 
Iraqi citizen my point is what is so-called the program of reconstructing Iraq, doesn't show 
                                                          
1 International Reconstruction Fund Facility: http://www.irffi.org 
2 DAD- Development Assistance Database, June 6, 2009: www.mop-iraq.org/dad 
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any significant if the situation is compared with the huge amount of money spent on that 
program.  
A visitor to the country now may not find a big difference from the situation in Iraq after the 
end of military operations in April 2003, and what is demonstrated  through media of 
reconstructing programs are which are far away from reality. They are no more than very 
simple activities less than required and sometimes lack accuracy.   
The slowness and lack of clarity, lack of transparency are the most important features of Iraqi 
reconstruction programs that the observers can no longer know what is behind the curtains.  
Numerous studies affirmed my view that the proportions of what is being implemented in 
reality of reconstruction programs are very limited. The  Japanese study estimated that the 
rate of implemented reconstruction programs did not exceed 5%, and other studies and 
surveys show that this implemented programs even though were very limited, but only 27% 
of the money is spent  as investment and the rest goes as the following; 30% is spent for 
security expenditure and 10% is spent for the U.S. Embassy and their employees,12% of the 
investment goes for financing the foreign manpower and 6% is spent as profits to the 
executing companies and 15% for administrative corruption. Those mentioned numbers are 
published by the Center of International Strategic Studies in Washington. 
 
2 
 What worsen the matter are the costs of the securities and protection to those executed 
companies that sometimes reach 50% or even 60% of the cost, as estimated by the former 
Iraqi Planning Minister Mehdi Al-Hafez.   
     Six years have passed now, but the promise to rebuild the lost infrastructure remains 
largely unfulfilled.  
The examples of the sort of unfulfilled projects in many if the Iraqi sectors are shown as 
follow: 
A. Electricity in Iraq  
     During the Saddam rule, Baghdad received electricity for between (16 and 24) hours per 
day with (4 to 8) hours received outside of the capital.  
Information from the Brookings Institution in the early of 2007 indicates that Baghdad 
receives electricity from (4 to 8) hours only per day with the remainder of the nation 
receiving from (8 to 12) hours of electricity per day3. Currently, the output of the electricity 
sector in Iraq averages less than 6,000 MW, while the demand is typically more than 10,000 
MW4. The average peak electricity supply was 4,280 MW falling short of demand averaged 
8,180 MW by about 3,950 MW according to (U.S.A) agency officials.  
 
                                                          
3 Brooking-Quality, Independence, Impact,2010 : The Brookings institution: www.brookings.edu 
4 IW, Industry week-connecting Manufacturing’s Leaders: General Electric wins $3 Billion Iraqi  
Power Deal: http://www.industryweek.com     
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B. Security 
     Security‘s file is one of thorny issues, and complex. Started after 2003, and affected on 
the reconstruction of Iraq, this situation is still going, although the huge budget allocated it. 
About one out of every five dollars that goes toward nonmilitary Iraqi reconstruction is spent 
on security, United States America officials estimate. It’s incomparably more problematic 
than either corruption or bureaucratic red tape,” Stuart Bowen., who heads the office of the 
Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR), told in May 2006.5  
 
C. Water Supply 
     During the USA-led invasion in 2003, water systems and sewage treatment plants were 
damaged or destroyed; many of these plants remain dysfunctional.    
According to the International Committee of the Red Cross (ICRC), one in four Iraqis does 
not have access to safe drinking water as of 2010. Most of the Iraqis who have access to safe 
drinking water still only have scarce and unreliable supplies.  
Additionally, it is estimated that 80% of discharged sewage is untreated due to frequent 
power outages.6 
 
                                                          
5 Economic Doldrums in Iraq, council on foreign Relations, June 20, 2007:         
http://www.cfr.org/publication/13629/economic_doldrums_in_iraq. 
6 NCCI OP-ED: Iraq - Water Scarcity in the Land of Two Ancient Rivers, Aug 3, 2010:  
http://www.reliefweb.int 
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D. Healthcare 
     Iraqi health officials say health-care conditions across the country are improving, but are 
still desperate. Mortality rates for children younger than 5 years (46 per 1000 live births) and 
maternal mortality rates (84 per 100 000 live births) are far higher than in neighboring 
countries, and far higher than before the invasion, when these indicators had already tripled 
after a decade of economic sanctions. Although the USA Government has devoted huge 
amount to the reconstruction of Iraq since 2003, to health-care infrastructure, but it is far less 
than has been spent on new vehicles for the Iraqi Army.7 
 The opening of new health clinics has been hailed as a minor victory for Iraq’s recovery 
efforts, according to the U.S. State Department. A total of eighty-five primary healthcare 
centers have been built since 2003; roughly half are providing care. But like electricity and 
water services, challenges remain. The State Department says data compiled by the Iraqi 
Ministry of Health show that over 50 percent of the country’s medical staff has fled Iraq in 
recent years. Oxfam International paints a dire picture. “Health services are generally in a 
catastrophic situation in the capital, in the main towns, and across the governorates,” the July 
2007 report notes. “Of the 180 hospitals countrywide, 90 percent lack key resources 
including basic medical and surgical supplies.8 
                                                          
7 The Lancet Reconstruction efforts in Iraq failing health care.  
   http://www.thelancet.com/journals/lancet/article 
8 Rebuilding Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations, January17, 2008: http://www.cfr.org/publication 
5 
E. Education 
     Iraq has a long and proud tradition of distinguished universities, a sequence of wars and 
sanctions in recent years have severely damaged the system. After the recent invasion of Iraq 
by the coalition forces, 84% of the infrastructure in Iraqi higher education institutions has 
been burnt, looted or severely destroyed in some form; 48 academics have been assassinated 
and many are under daily threat.9    
Since 2003, the war on terror and sectarian conflict has further destabilized the education 
system in Iraq. About (2751) schools were damaged severely and require rehabilitation. 2400 
schools experienced looting. An estimated 6,200 schools have been repaired since 2003.10 
 
F. Transportation 
     Transportation consists of railways, highways, waterways, pipelines, ports and harbors, 
marines, and airports. In late 2007 plans were under way to reopen the Mosul airport to 
civilian flights, a major step for the country’s still struggling aviation sector. “Iraqi Airways 
is currently updating the airport’s construction and equipment, including the terminals, 
watchtowers and other facilities,” and 96 of 98 railroad stations have been repaired, the 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) noted in September 2007. Still, like challenges facing 
                                                          
9 The current status and future prospects for the transformation and reconstruction of the higher education 
system in Iraq: www.unu.edu/news/ili/Iraq.doc 
10 Rebuilding Iraq, Council Foreign Relations, January17,2008: http://www.cfr.org/publication 
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the oil and water sectors, efforts to rebuild damaged transportation arteries have been slowed 
by security threats. “Road repairs, mostly village roads, are only targeting a very small 
percentage of total road and bridge work required,” the CRS report concluded.11 
G. Communication Systems 
     One of the success stories in infrastructure is the communications sector, with Iraqis 
accessing domestic mobile phone service for the first time in the country's history. Under 
Saddam there were no mobile phone providers in Iraq and, according to the State Department, 
just 1.2 million people out of the total population of 26 million subscribed to landline phone 
service, but during the looting and violence after U.S. entry into Iraq in 2003, an estimated 
half of the landline infrastructure was damaged, so the need for mobile technology was 
immediate. Unlike the electricity and transportation sectors, the cellular tower infrastructure 
has been largely safe from violence, in part because the insurgents rely on mobile phones to 
coordinate attacks."Everybody needs a mobile phone, whether you are a terrorist, whether 
you are a government official, or whether you are a member of the public," Dr. Siyamend 
Othman, CEO of Iraq's National Communications and Media Commission, told the 
Washington Post in January 2006. 
As of August 2006, there were over 8 million subscribers to telephone service, an estimated 
half of which are mobile users, and multiple service providers have emerged. Internet 
                                                          
11 Rebuilding Iraq, Council Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/publication 
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accessibility has not fared as well, with the number of registered users falling from 207,000 
in April 2006 to 198,000 in August, according to the Brookings Institute's Iraq Index.12 
2. The Purpose of the Study 
     This study is an attempt to make a preliminary observation about the difficulty the Iraqi 
Reconstruction Fund has encountered with its reconstruction efforts. If ask what are the 
reasons behind that? Where have the grants or the donors’ money gone? The study focuses on 
the primary infrastructures were targeted by the Fund, which include electricity, water supply, 
education (preliminary or higher education), law enforcement, and governance public 
administration. 
It is important to stress at the outset that this study is of exploratory nature because the 
political instability of the Iraqi society today makes it virtually impossible to collect 
systematic data. Much of the data on which this study relies comes from available 
government reports and anecdotal evidence. 
 
  
                                                          
12 The online news hour, Iraq in Transition, January 25, 2007: PBS News Hour: 
http://www.pbs.org/newshour/indepth_coverage/middle_east/iraq 
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3. Significance of this Study 
     Somebody may question the wisdom of conducting this study at a time of great 
volatility where reliable information is hard to come by my argument to this question is 
somebody must start some place and provide a benchmark for future study that is more 
rigorous. Meanwhile life gives on and people must figure out ways to fill the “cracks” as 
much as they can. This study is conceived with an aim to identify the locus of the problems to 
explore possible options. The study aims at finding many reasonable suggestions that might 
contribute to develop the situation in the near future. 
4. The Sources of Data 
     Data used for this study comes mainly from governmental publications, publications of the 
Ministry of Planning, official reports, journals, articles, meetings with Politicians, economical 
reports, various reports published by United Nations UN, and World Bank, the International 
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq web site, the Development Assistance Database web 
site, the quarterly reports issued by the department of international cooperation at the ministry 
of planning,  and other sites related to the subject. I obtained this official data personally by 
visiting the Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation- the Central Organization for 
Statistics and Information Technology, and the Database Center of the Ministry. They 
provide me with the necessary data officially by coordination between the Ministry of Higher 
Education in which I employed and the Ministry of Planning.    
9 
5. Limitations of the Study 
     I have not been all to have access to the operating budget and expenditures of the Fund, 
because the authorities keep them “confidential” owing to terrorist threats to blow up any 
reconstruction project. The unavailability of the expenditure data makes it difficult to make 
any time association of the wisdom the budget allocating.  
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II. ISSUE BACKGROUND  
     Since 2003, Iraq is witnessing a process of political and economic transition from 
heavily centralized state to a democratic state incorporating free market principles.  
The stumbling political process , failure  to build capable institutions to carry out tasks of 
reconstructions, inability to establish effective partnership with international partner, in 
addition to insecurity and violence prevailed in the period 2004 to end of 2006, all these 
factors have led to the delay and hampering of reconstruction and development despite 
enormous investments of international and national resources. 
It is difficult to find successful examples of states that have experienced post conflict 
reconstruction. One of reasons that can be diagnosed is considering reconstruction as a mere 
rebuilding and not an integrated process between economic and social development. 
Taking in to account that a post conflict society is often torn by a crisis and problems that are 
exacerbated by continued instability and threats to human security, given that security and 
stability are prerequisite for sustainable reconstruction and development.  
In this context, it should be pointed out that the source of fragility in Iraq, is weak 
institutional capacity to provide services including security and stability, and in order move 
from fragility to resilience and responsiveness. 
In Iraq, the democratic transitions provided the basis for legitimacy through elections. 
Resources also exist for the government to start re-building efficient institutional structures, 
11 
once political will and capacity are present. However, the fragility of the political process, the 
sequential change of government and the intensive staff turnover, resulted in failure to sustain 
reform attempts by government or the donor community. In addition to the in ability of 
political process to promote what is a consensual national identity, but was limited to a 
narrow regional thinking, which affected by the course of reconstruction and development.  
Aid provided for institutional capacity development has not been able to strengthen 
institutions due to shallow and superficial choice of training programs which failed to live up 
to international standards of professional development.   
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
12 
III. THE INFRASTRUCTURE DEVELOPMENT FUND  
     In the Madrid conference, 2003 the donors examined the urgency of reconstructing the 
Iraqi infrastructure, which was presented by the World Bank (WB), the United Nations (UN), 
and the International Monetary Fund (IMF) respectively. The Donors reaffirmed their resolve 
to meet the urgent needs of the Iraqi population, emphasizing the importance of effective 
coordination of humanitarian, reconstruction, and development assistance.  
The priorities that were Firstly:  strengthening institutions for transparent governance, and 
secondly: restoring critical infrastructure including electricity, water supply, education, law 
enforcement. Emphasis was emplaced on good governance because no reconstruction was 
possible if there were no efficient administration structure. That might be the main fields I 
suppose. The table below is summarizes pledges made at the International Donors' 
Conference for Iraq.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
13 
Table1. Donor pledged to help Reconstruct Iraq Infrastructure at the Madrid Conference, 
2003. 
    Contribution to the Reconstruction Fund 2004 2005-2007 Unspecified 
by Year 
TOTAL 
Grants International Reconstruction Fund Facility 
for Iraq 
322.12 0.00 83.17 405.29 
— World Bank Iraq Trust Fund 66.09 0.00 0.00 66.09 
— UNDG Trust Fund 6.38 0.00 3.53 9.91 
— Unspecified Fund Facility Contribution 249.65 0.00 79.63 329.28 
   Bilateral Grants 110.22 78.19 19,502.71 19,691.13 
   Unspecified Grants 252.87 225.42 1,697.00 2,175.29 
   Total Grants 685.21 303.62 21,282.88 22,271.71 
Loans 1,470.00 4,655.00 — 
8,355.00 
3,500.00 9,625.00 — 
13,325.00 
Unspecified 0.00 0.00 335.62 335.62 
TOTAL 2,155.21 4,958.62 — 
8,658.62 
25,118.50 32,232.33 — 
35,932.33 
International Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq website: http://www.irffi.org 
The pledges made be the donors were in the amount of $32 billion, the Madrid conference 
decided that the grants and loans were to be channeled through the Trust Fund Facility (TFF) 
or bilateral assistance of which Almost the two-thirds were from the United States. 
As Table 1 shows, Therefore, (25) donors have pledged is about (USA$1.841, 977,647) 
billion to the Trust Fund Facility (TFF) to ensure responsive financing for near-term.  
14 
According to the Ministry of Planning the pledge that is received by the country is about $ 28 
billion. The United States of America grants is the main committed among the other donors 
that reach $16 billion.13  
A database of international aid is adopted by the Ministry of Planning since the beginning of 
2005 to record all events and activities of donors as a major source of information.  
The total amount of aid is about $28 billion U.S. dollars since 2003 until the June 2009.  
The received money that is about $28 billion has been allocated for reconstruct the Iraqi 
infrastructure. The amount of the money is astronomical, but the real spending on 
infrastructure has been far smaller than the pledged amount. One estimate given by the Donor 
Assistance Data base in Iraqi ministry of planning indicates that  the grants provided 
through multilateral channels like the EU and IRFFI does not exceed 10% of the pledged 
amount, reflecting the limited role of the government in exercising ownership through the 
multilateral channel, which in turn limiting the efficiency and effectiveness of aid.14 
This study attempts to see where all the money has gone and why.  
 
 
 
 
                                                          
iraq.org/dad-www.mop, June 3, 2009: Development Assistance Database 13 
14 Position paper on aid management in Iraq: http://www.mop-iraq.org/mopdc/resources/pdf   
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IV. FAILURES OF THE RECONSTRUCTION EFFORTS  
     Was brings many unexpected contingencies, but international terrorism causes havoc 
on planned reconstruction efforts. Much has to be improvised and ad hoc in operation, such is 
the condition of the post war Iraq. A large sum of reconstruction funds were made worldly, 
but they were not spent on the planned activities. They are several sectors that contribute to 
the waste of the Fund. Main reasons those might contribute to worsen the Iraqi situation, and 
promote not to the country development. It is six long years left; with huge of money that 
must raise the burden of the society as much as the grants and what is to be followed: 
1. Administrative fragmentations: 
¾ Bulk of the grants and international aids are spent on humanitarian projects, service 
far from investment.  
¾ The original allocation of (IRFFI) funds to the various sectors has undergone through 
a series of reallocation. These reallocation changes have involved shifting money 
from vital sectors as the water supply, sanitation, and electricity to meet security 
needs. 
2. Inefficient Administrative all levels: 
¾ The loss of coordination and exchange of experiences between the international 
donors and the Iraqi Strategic Review Board (ISRB) that is responsible for 
implementation of projects.   
16 
¾ The rate of disbursement of funds administered by the United Nations and World 
Bank has been slow.  
¾ Lack of administrative oversight because there is inadequate information on the cost-
to-complete projects already in progress.  
¾ The high turnover rates of government employees and lack of skilled technocrats. 
 
3. Mismanagement and corruption: 
¾ The failure to provide the necessary data on the details of expenditure of programs 
and projects, and, therefore, the inability to include them in the state budget, and 
applying accountability mechanisms for national control and auditing.  
¾ Many false Iraqi and foreign (NGOs) that looks like contracting companies than 
humanitarian and human rights organizations. 
¾ Serious problem with project follow-up, as for building a school: payments are made 
and no-one shows up to see if it is being done. 
¾ The lack of transparency and incompetence uncovered by the (SIGIR) led to 
accusations of corruption in which over-invoicing by contractors has been a recurrent 
theme. 
 
17 
4. Lack of security and political instability: 
¾ Attacks, murders, bombings and armed vandalism are routine threats to reconstruction 
contractors.  
¾ Many United Nations agencies have had great difficulty operating in Iraq due to the 
poor security situation. 
¾ It is estimated that quarter of reconstruction funds have been used to provide security 
to construction workers and job sites. 
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V. ADMINISTRATION OF THE RECONSTRUCTION FUND  
     In this section I demonstrate the real situation of the sectors that benefit the grants 
allocated to revive them. I attempt to show the policy making that is used by the international 
donors. Then I would try to show the result of the rehabilitating and reconstructing these 
sectors. 
1. The Grants Distribution According to the Sectors 
         After 2003 Iraq has received the international aids, which is more than $28 billion 
through the Official Development Aid (ODA), in the form of grants and concessional loans 
pledged. This aid has been provided through two channels. The first through the International 
Fund Facility for the Reconstruction of Iraq (IRFFI), established after Madrid donors’ 
conference as a multilateral channel to receive financial support from donor countries. The 
Development Assistance Database (DAD) of donor countries in Iraq indicates the impact of 
contributions by some donors to Iraq. The funds allocated by donor’s countries to implement 
reconstruction projects in Iraq (grants) that is about (US$ 21,957,361,156) billion in the 
period between 2003 - end of June 2009.  
The (U.S.A) is the largest in total pledges to (US$ 18,410,000,000).  
The table number (2) show the policy  that is used by the international donors, and  the 
donors concentrate mostly on most of the sectors, but many criticisms might be raised in this 
matter, as follows:   
19 
A. It gives the first priority to build governance and democracy, which might weaken the 
contribution to the other sectors.  
B. The other thing is that it gives totals to many sectors all together as for the (housing, 
Labor, Social Affairs). This means mixing services sectors with other sort of investment as 
housing and labor. The same thing in classifying the sectors of (education, science, and 
culture), and the (agriculture, the food and culture), Thus ambiguity is the main feature of 
such classification, under the supervision of the (UN) and the World Bank which suppose to 
readjust the economical policy of the country towards development and growth. 
C. The sectors of reconstructing the infrastructures of the society are identified in the table; in 
addition to that the table refers to a category nominated as infrastructure. Thus, this sort of 
duplication and vague classification is really confusing because it could not show exactly in 
what sector(s) the money is allocated. 
D. The other and last thing is that the table refers to (3) categories under the words 
unclassified, Indefinite, Unassigned. This adds sort of misleading about the money and the 
sectors flows. This contributes to worsen the managerial processes of these sectors and the 
result turn to be disappointed. 
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Table 2 show the Distribution of projects funded by donor countries: 
Sector   Cost of the Project
           (U.S. $) 
Amounts committed
           (U.S. $ ) 
  Disbursements
      (U. S. $) 
Agriculture , Food & Fishing 813,318,827 602,367,734  324,368,785 
Economic Development 275,736,723 203,517,134  68,226,774 
Education , Science & culture 1,015,222,342 930,209,551  791,325,497 
Energy 2,742,039,993 2,739,984,792  2,504,755,712 
Projects  & Industry 52,006,755 14,268,965  13,074,798 
Environment 1,226,255,664 1,029,766,937  694,197,026 
 Governance & Democracy Development 1,748,118,642 1,539,844,287  1,262,798,457 
Health 1,056,932,101 780,402,218  625,505,169 
Housing , Labor & Social Affairs 2,432,167,252 2,088,333,699  1,456,612,432 
Infrastructure 7,208,320,761 6,891,631,497  5,378,178,152 
Security 1,722,608,851 712,482,172  649,231,878 
Unclassified 211,574,070 209,829,757  198,826,605 
Indefinite 50,935,748 19,255,558  10,563,714 
Unassigned 2,141,326,808 2,135,280,977  1,647,752,537 
Total 21,957,361,156 19,897,175,278  15,625,417,536
The number of international donors to the (IRFFI) has reached (25) members including the 
(EU), and the total contribution of donors is approximately (USA$1.841, 977,647) billion. 
Table NO. (3) Shows the projects financed by the (WB and UN) for the reconstruction 
International Funds for Iraq 
reconstruction 
Total cost 
(USA$) 
Number of projects Commitment 
(USA$) 
Expense 
(USA$) 
United Nations Fund 1,353,077,647 166 1,233,049,208 875,022,000 
Fund World Bank 488,900,000 18 488,900,000 251,500,000 
TOTAL 1,841,977,647 184 1,721,949,208 1,126,522,000
In table number (3) shows that about billion (USA$) has expensed to establish about (184) 
projects in the sectors shows in the table number (3). 
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The table number (4) shows that the United Nations (UN) and the World Bank (WB) follow 
the same classification of the donors though the World Bank is one of the main international 
institutions in finance reallocation and adjustments. Therefore: 
1. The priories are not clear set in setting the sectors that need to be developed or rebuild.  
2. Most of observation by the student for the last table is committing in this field that shown 
in the table (4) thought the World Bank is one of the experts of the international institution in 
the world that is responsible for drawing the public strategies of allocating the flaws and 
adjustment economies to development.  
Table 4: The Distribution of projects funded by (WB and UN) for the reconstruction 
Sector       Project Cost 
(U.S. $) 
   Amounts committed 
(U.S. $ ) 
Security  12,690,012 12,690,012  
Housing , Labor & Social Affairs 323,393,253  178,765,683  
Infrastructure 274,937,991  219,802,383  
Environment 252,276,382  148,065,468  
Education , Science & culture 290,028,050  266,600,859  
Economic Development 146,089,396  95,757,649 
Agriculture , Food & Fishing 323,538,817  305,366,505  
Health 276,652,069  199,246,717  
Projects  & Industry 4,824,670  586,880  
Governance & Democracy Development 377,401,237  296,912,671  
Unclassified 27,016,705  7,326,972 
Indefinite 24,617,235  24,617,235  
Unassigned 5,871,891  5,871,891  
TOTAL 1,841,977,647 1,721,949,208 
 
Table (4) Iraqi Strategic Board, the tenth annual Report, Source Ministry of Planning\2009 
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United Nations Fund for the reconstruction of Iraq UNDG.ITF 
Table 5: Total expenditure for projects funded by the United Nations Fund for 
reconstruction 
(UNDG-ITF) by sector (U.S. $) for the years (2004 -2009)  
  
Spending 
Sector 
 
2009- 2004  
    Disbursements 
(U. S. $) 
Amounts committed
   (U.S. $ ) 
438,580,000 521,525,000 Basic Social Services 
143,027,000 168,431,000 - Education 
49,215,000 60,237,000 - Water and Sanitation 
118,051,000 152,924,000 - Health 
22,936,000 24,541,000 - Housing and Shelter 
105,351,000 115,392,000 - Security Food, Agriculture and Food   
73,436,000 75,821,000 - Agriculture and Water Resources 
21,697,000 29,354,000 - Rural Development 
10,217,000 10,217,000 - Security Food 
33,044,000 32,574,000 Protection 
22,840,000 23,880,000 - Protection 
10,204,000 8,695,000 - Mine Action 
232,560,000 235,505,000 Governance 
48,936,000 47,884,000 - Democratic Process 
1,960,000 1,960,000 - Culture 
- -     -     Reform of the Public Sector 
33,000 4,000 - Decentralization Programs 
181,631,000 185,657,000 - Support the Electoral Process 
170,556,000 183,787,000 Economic Development 
24,827,000 27,142,000 - Economic Reform  and Diversification 
104,809,000 113,191,000 - Infrastructure for Electricity 
25,422,000 27,723,000 - Poverty Reduction 
25,422,000 27,723,000 - Development 
15,498,000 15,731,000 - Environment 
282,000 295,000 Draft Emergency Response 
875,022,000 973,686,000 Total 
 
Table (5) Iraqi Strategic Board, the tenth annual Report, Source Ministry of Planning \ 2009 
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World Bank's fund for the reconstruction of Iraq 
Table 6: Distribution of assistance the World Bank's Fund for the reconstruction of Iraq by 
major sectors 
 
Disbursements
    (U. S. $) 
Amounts      
committed 
(U.S. $ ) 
Cost of the Project
     (U.S. $) 
 Number 
of 
  projects 
 Implementing organizations 
10,047,929 83,571,428 202,500,000 4 
Housing , Labor & Social 
Affairs 
7,846,509 27,500,000 55,000,000 1 Infrastructure 
7,147,929 61,071,428 180,000,000 3 Environment 
67,900,000 106,000,000 106,000,000 3 Education , Science & culture 
11,434,190 31,952,331 64,783,639 2 Economic Development 
3,345,936 8,695,652 46,000,000 1 Agriculture , Food & Fishing 
13,000,000 33,700,000 33,700,000 2 Health 
8,800,000 10,600,000 10,600,000 2 
Governance & Democracy 
Development 
251,500,000 488,900,000 488,900,000 15 Total 
Table (6) Iraqi Strategic Board, the tenth annual Report, Source Ministry of Planning 
     The second channel is bilateral aids by donor’s countries to support specific sectors or to 
provide technical assistance in certain areas, and  most of these projects are not passing 
through Iraqi Strategic Review Board (ISRB), and International Advisory and Monitoring 
Board (IAMB) mechanism, because (92%) of the projects have been financed through 
bilateral agreement  most of the (U.S.A) projects are funded in this way, except the (EU), 
(99%) of the contributions is channeled through credit-funds managed by the United Nations 
and World Bank.15  
                                                          
15 Iraq, Ministry of Planning and Development Cooperation, Iraqi Strategic Board, The tenth annual  
  Report 2009 
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  Table 7: shows the contributions to eight major donor states, which represent 79% of the total 
international aid, except the U.S.A donation, including obligations and the amounts of money they 
abided by due to expenditure channels, whether through international funds for reconstruction of 
any amounts that have been filed or through direct spending by bilateral channels, in another word 
the amounts of money they obliged by to implement projects. 
Amounts committed through spending channels  
Pledges 
 
State Through 
(UNDP.TTF)  
Through 
(WB.ITF) 
Through 
(UNDG.IT)
Through bilateral 
channels 
- 5,000,000  5,000,000  15,718,819,408  18,410,000,000  U.S.A 
- 130,000,000 360,950,0001,060,167,656 5,000,000,000 Japan 
- 4,000,000 11,000,000210,245,929 260,000,000 Korea 
- 74,074,074 55,555,556448,706,893 1,137,037,037 United Kingdom 
- 5,797,101 10,618,949100,769,873 58,424,464 Sweden 
- 22,300,000 46,400,000109,538,910 286,085,242 Canada 
43,037,975 152,433,862 492,771,5115,710,111 687,815,006 European Union 
- - 29,705,514240,213,181 273,753,133 Italy 
Table (7) Iraqi Strategic Board, the tenth annual Report, Source Ministry of Planning 
The American projects that are registered in the database of the Iraqi Ministry of Planning 
reached to 19, 230 ones in a total cost amounted 17,221,279,012. Despite the fact that 77% of 
the U.S.A official funds had been included in the database of information as a draft, however, 
these data still needed to be checked and updated, since there are many of registered projects 
do not have the required details. Moreover, these data did not have the beneficiaries of these 
projects. Through the available data one could have an idea about the U.S.A trends of 
spending aids as part of the reconstruction campaign. The following table (8) shows the 
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amounts allocated and spent in U.S dollars for each sector: 
The proportion of total
       spending 
  Disbursements
      (USA$) 
Total cost 
      (USA$)  
Sector 
37% 4,632,578,1786,080,410,209Infrastructure 
7% 842,163,865 1,035,804,175Governance & Democracy Development
4% 456,234,626 493,340,266 Security 
9% 1,186,646,3331,822,894,334Housing , Labor & Social Affairs 
1% 123,191,561 232,831,629 Agriculture , Food & Fishing 
4% 466,982,244 717,250,280 Environment 
20% 2,475,334,9022,707,773,794Energy 
1% 124,589,307 280,553,245 Health 
4% 515,787,025 552,256,426 Education , Science & culture 
0% 43,961 43,961 Economic Development 
0% 9,945,820 10,760,410 Projects  & Industry 
13% 1,614,401,7692,077,182,317Indefinite 
1% 153,236,733 155,083,328 Unclassified 
0% 129,189 560,400 Unassigned 
100% 12,653,005,09317,221,279,012TOTAL 
Table (8) Iraqi Strategic Board, the tenth annual Report, Source Ministry of Planning 
(42%) of the projects cannot identify the nature of the project, because of the lack of detailed 
information about the project. Such as a description of the project that is classified under 
Uncategorized. Most of these projects under the infrastructure sector, especially the 
electricity sector cannot know what type of project or the nature of the reconstruction projects 
in most of the electricity sector. billions of dollars of grants and humanitarian aid and services, 
either by the coalition forces, or a mission the United Nations have, or by state agencies of 
the Federal and local communities, or by non-governmental organizations, which helped to 
some extent in bridging some of the urgent humanitarian needs on the level of health, 
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educational, and service. The above I would try to show the result of the rehabilitating and 
reconstructing of some of important these sectors.  
VI. SUCCESS AND FAILURES OF THE INFRASTRUCTURE RECONSTRUCTION 
(FINDINGS)   
     According to Iraq need to the international aids, humanitarian, and economic aid from 
the presence of donor countries, to raise Iraq from collapse, the  country spent billions of 
dollars of grants and humanitarian aid and services, either by the coalition forces, or mission, 
UN, or by state agencies of the Federal and local communities, or by non-governmental 
organizations, which have helped to some extent in bridging some of the pressing needs in 
sector of health, and educational, and service. 
 There are many projects implemented through the conversion of donor countries and donor 
organizations, including the draft water Nasiriyah, and the draft water Balad Ruz, and the 
project streams of Fallujah, and the rehabilitation of 14 established stations for drinking water, 
100 water pumping station, and heavy processing more than 100 heavy machines varied, and 
funded from the grant America. In addition to advisory work for the start of 7 water projects, 
sewage and physical development of a grant funded by the World Bank, and the supply 
mechanism of 382 by grant funded by Japan. A start a Smart Village in Kirkuk, Dhi Qar, and 
preparation for the development of towns on the Iraqi-Iranian border, and improve drinking 
water in parts of Basra province, and urban development neighborhood of 14 Ramadan in 
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Diwaniya, with funding from the United Nations agencies.16  
     This study began with an aim to explain why the reconstruction fund has not made much 
progress to rebuild the Iraq infrastructure. A preliminary observation of the administration of 
the Reconstruction Fund shows several inevitable short comings:  
First, Security Instability 
     The attacks, the murders, the bombings and armed vandalism are routine threats to 
reconstruction contractors. Since reconstruction began in March 2003 until July 30, 2009, 
there are about (1395) workers on (U.S.A) funded projects have died according to the 
(U.S.A) departments of Labor and State. The table number (9) shows the number of worker 
dead in each quarter starting with the first reporting by (SIGIR).  
In addition, there have been thousands of insurance claims by construction workers for 
injuries sustained in attacks. The figures are probably misreported, especially among the Iraqi 
contractors. Intimidation of workers has delayed projects and reduced the availability of non-
Iraqi expert technicians. It is estimated that (25%) of reconstruction funds have been used to 
provide security to construction workers and job sites. Attacks and vandalism have also 
affected completed projects including sabotage of oil pipelines and high-voltage electricity 
                                                          
16 Jamil Odaah, Advisor to the Ministry of State for Civil Society Affairs, July5, 2008 “Foreign grants to Iraq,  
It has achieved its objectives?  http://www.alnoor.se/article.asp?id=27499   
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towers.17 
 
Year Quarter 1 Quarter 2 Quarter 3 Quarter 4 
2004 NA NA 22 112 
2005 44 54 85 52 
2006 52 59 91 101 
2007 152 79 72 43 
2008 58 48 33 35 
2009 57 29   
Table No. (9) Shows the number of worker deaths in each quarter starting with the first 
reporting by (SIGIR). 
International (INGOs) found operating in Iraq highly dangerous to their staff, as between 
March 2003 and March 2008 (94) aid workers are killed, (248) are injured, (24) arrested or 
detained and (89) kidnapped or abducted. This has led (INGOs) to completely unwind their 
operations, or make their activities as low profile as possible. (INGOs) are not treated as 
neutral parties by large sections of the population due to their beginning operations alongside 
the invasion and receiving security and funding from the multinational force and the 
governments that it consists of. The security situation has also led too much of the 
management of aid programs to take place abroad, thus lowering the effectiveness of the 
programs and creating a fragmented response.18  
                                                          
17Special Inspector General For Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Report to Congress October 30, 07 the Human Toll 
http://www.sigir.mil/404.html?aspxerrorpath=/reports/quarterlyreports/Oct07/Default.aspx 
  18 Sarah Bailey and Rachel Atkinson (2008) Humanitarian action in Iraq: putting the pieces together 
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Researchers at the Overseas Development Institute have discussed the importance of using 
local organizations and also understanding the violence not a single insurmountable challenge, 
but understanding various acts of violence more individually, sharing the knowledge between 
agencies and responding more appropriately - the formation of the( NGO) Coordination 
Committee in Iraq is a step in this direction.  
About one out of every five dollars that goes toward nonmilitary Iraqi reconstruction is spent 
on security, (U.S.A) officials estimate. “It’s incomparably more problematic than either 
corruption or bureaucratic red tape,” Stuart Bowen Jr., who heads the office of the Special 
Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).19 
Second, Under Coordinated: (Proliferation and Fragmentation of Donor Aid) 
     The bulk of the grants and international aid spent on humanitarian projects, service and 
temporary, such as street cleaning, and restoration of buildings of the State, schools, hospitals, 
and payment of some salaries, especially in 2003-2004, buying clothes and food to poor 
families or displaced, and other resources exchange non-investment.20 
Data shows that many of the projects were carried out through multi and bilateral channels 
like the (EU) and (IRFFI) which does not exceed (10%) of the total grant.  
                                                                                                                                                                                    
   Overseas Development Institute: http://www.odi.org.uk 
19 Economic Doldrums in Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations, June 20, 2007: http://www.cfr.org/publication 
20 Jamil Odaah, Advisor to the Ministry of State for Civil Society Affairs, July 5, 2008 “Foreign grants to Iraq, it 
has achieved its objectives?  http://www.alnoor.se/article.asp?id=27499     
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The other thing is the limited role of the government in exercising ownership through the 
multilateral channel, which in turn limiting the efficiency and effectiveness of aid.  
In addition to earmarking of donors resources to specific sectors resulted in decreasing 
ownership and limited consistency with national priorities. 
The fragmentation in projects sizes and the increasing number of small projects may add 
additional costs to the implementing departments.  
And the steady increase in the volume of official development aid has focused on increasing 
the number of projects rather than the maintenance and expansion of existing projects and 
activities to ensure sustainability of development outcomes.  
In this context, it be should noted that the donor’s countries implemented their aid Programs 
without consulting the Iraqi federal government and sectoral ministries, but directly though 
local authorities, and sometimes went to heads of clans in districts, causing confusion and 
waste of financial resources in areas which may not contribute to advance the level of 
development in provinces, or focus only on narrow political gains.21  
Table No. (10)  Shows the changes that occurred in allocations 
Sector Allocation Prior to 30 September 
2004 
Allocation as of 31 
December 2005 
Electricity 5.46 4.22 
Water Resources and Sanitation 4.25 2.13 
Security and Law Enforcement 3.24 5.04 
Justice, Public Safety Infrastructure and 1.48 2.35 
                                                          
21 Position paper on aid management in Iraq: http://www.mop-iraq.org/mopdc/resources/pdf 
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Civil Society 
Private Sector Development 0.18 0.45 
Iraq Debt Forgiveness 0.00 0.35 
Oil Infrastructure 1.70 1.74 
Health Care 0.79 0.74 
Transportation and Telecommunication 0.50 0.47 
Education, Refugees and Human Rights 0.26 0.41 
Roads, Bridges and Construction 0.37 0.33 
Administrative 0.21 0.21 
Total 18.44 18.44 
 The original allocation of (IRFFI) funds to the various sectors has undergone a series of 
reassignments. These allocation changes have occurred in September and December, 2004 
and March and December, 2005 and generally involved shifting money from water resources 
and sanitation and electricity sectors to meet security needs and to provide training and 
operating funds for facilities already rehabilitated under IRRF funding. The table above 
shows the changes that occurred in allocations (billions of $US) between September 200422  
and December 2005.23  
Third, Mismanagement and Corruption 
      No-bid contracts have been awarded to large American corporations including 
Halliburton and Bechtel. Halliburton in particular has been singled out for receiving what is 
                                                          
22 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction, Report to Congress October 30, 2004 Table 8 
(PDF) http://www.sigir.mil/reports/quarterlyreports/Oct04/cpaig_october_30_report.pdf.    
23 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) Audit Report 06-004 April 28, 2006, Table 1" 
(PDF). http://www.sigir.mil/reports/pdf/audits/06-004.pdf.  
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perceived to be government favoritism for doing a shoddy job of rebuilding Iraq's oil 
infrastructure.24    
When the Pentagon's own auditors determined that about ($263) million of a Halliburton 
subsidiary's costs were potentially excessive, the Army still paid the company all but $10.1 
million of the disputed costs.25 
Some say that the reconstruction would have been both much more efficient and inexpensive 
if more contracts were granted to local Iraqi firms, many of whom were  
Shut out of the process due to the fact that they were state-owned26. Congressman Henry 
Waxman was once told by members of the Iraqi governing council that paying Iraqi 
companies to rebuild Iraq instead of American ones would save American tax payers 90% of 
the costs.27  
In addition to the security costs for project construction which may sometime exceed 40% of 
the (USA) projects costs. 
Gap of reconstruction which was defined as the difference between the reconstruction 
planned and that which is actually delivered? As of February 2006, Special Inspector General 
                                                          
24 Economic Doldrums in Iraq, June 20, 2007, Council on Foreign Relations: http://www.cfr.org/publication 
25 Glanz, James (April 25, 2006). Rebuilding of Iraqi Pipeline as Disaster Waiting to Happen  
The New York Times, Retrieved May, 22, 2010. http://www.nytimes.com/2006/04/25/world/middleeast  
26 Glanz, James (February 27, 2006). Army to Pay Halliburton Unit Most Costs Disputed by Audit. 
 The New York Times, Retrieved May, 22, 2010. 
27 Iraqi Experts Tossed With The Water". The Washington Post, February 27, 2004. . Retrieved May, 22, 201 
http://www.washingtonpost.com  The Ruse of Reconstruction 
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for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) reported that only 36% of water sector projects originally 
planned will be completed and only 70% of the originally-planned electricity sector projects 
will be completed. This shortfall is attributed to IRRF reprogramming of funds from these 
sectors to meet security needs, poor cost estimates in the original reconstruction plan, 
increased material costs and lack of administrative oversight. Estimates of the funds required 
to close the reconstruction gap are difficult to obtain because there is inadequate information 
on the cost-to-complete projects already in progress, in addition to funds for reconstruction.28 
 The lack of transparency and incompetence uncovered by the (SIGIR  ) led to accusations of 
corruption in which over-invoicing by contractors has been a recurrent theme. Bowen's office 
also found that due to inadequate financial controls regarding the payment of Iraqi employees, 
"there was no assurance that funds were not provided for so-called ‘ghost' employees." 
One (CPA) advisor to the ministry of finance estimated that there were as many as (250,000) 
– (300,000) ghost workers on the government's payroll.29 
The Coalition Provisional Authority (CPA) – inspector general (IG) report said. ‘As of 19 
June 2004, the local commanders have spent $364.6 million on over 27,600 small projects 
repairing and refurbishing water and sewer lines, cleaning up highways by removing waste 
and debris, transporting water to remote villages, purchasing equipment for local police 
                                                          
28 Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR) July 30, 2006 Quarterly and Semiannual Report to 
Congress: http://www.globalsecurity.org/military/library/report/2006/sigir-jul06_report.htm      
29 Iraq: where has the money gone? October 6, 2007: http://www.arabianbusiness.com/iraq-where-has-money-
gone--54293.html 
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stations, upgrading schools and clinics, purchasing school supplies, removing ordnance from 
public spaces. It was too little too late. With the concentration on big infrastructure projects 
and contracts for American corporate cronies and Iraqi businessmen ‘friends’30 
Fourth, Inefficient Administrative on All Levels 
     The loss of coordination of experiences among international donors on the one hand, 
and the departments responsible for implementation of projects financed by international 
donations on the other hand, thus, many projects are executed without recourse to the federal 
authorities or even local. Even the grant money spent on local companies, most of the money 
went to fertilizer, food, fuel, raw materials, and semi-manufactured products, not for building 
projects. The decline in financial flows lead to negative results reflected in the achievement 
of development.31 
In this context, it should be pointed out that the source of fragility in Iraq, is weak 
institutional capacity to provide services including security and stability, and in order move 
from fragility to resilience and responsiveness, a combination of capacity, resources. The 
fragility of the political process, the sequential change of government and the intensive staff 
turnover, resulted in failure to sustain reform attempts by government or the donor 
                                                          
30 London reviews of books (LRB), where has all the money gone? Ed Harriman follows the auditors into Iraq, 
July 7, 2005:  http://www.lrb.co.uk 
31 Jamil Odaah, Advisor to the Ministry of State for Civil Society Affairs, July 5, 2008 “Foreign grants to Iraq, it 
has achieved its objectives?  http://www.alnoor.se/article.asp?id=27499  
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community. In addition to the in ability of political process to promote what is a consensual 
national identity, but was limited to a narrow regional thinking, which affected by the course 
of reconstruction and development.  
The international partners engaged in Iraq without any political roadmap, and no previous 
experience working through two funding windows under very challenging circumstances. All 
stages of programming were affected, starting from planning and communication to being 
present on ground to manage projects. The threat to personal security was a major issue 
obstructing performance which led to the use of remote management style for Iraq programs.  
The weakness of the administrative structure of the facility was reflected through its 
operations, affecting the ability to develop a strategic direction for programming. Obviously, 
one of the reasons was poor political and institutional efficiency to contain and direct 
operations of the facility to constructive priorities.   
While the donor committee convened on regular basis for the period 2005-2007, I did not 
provide guidance or strategic direction to the facility, while the Iraqi government was 
experiencing institutional and security difficulties which required greater engagement by the 
donor community. Also, the government of Iraq was not able to benefit from the comparative 
advantage of both administrators and utilize them for formulation of priority programs. 
the lack of scientific competence and education facilities, and therefore, Iraq is facing a 
problem in the provision of qualified and trained to lead the reconstruction and reform, 
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particularly since most of the scientific competence has abandoned the country, The number 
of migrants (7350), of whom (67%) and university professors (23%) worked in scientific 
research centers, and Iraq has thus difficult to offset human investment.32  
Two million Iraqis have fled the country, many of them highly skilled professionals like 
engineers and doctors—the backbone of a middle class. An estimated (40 %) of Iraq’s 
professional class has fled the country, creating shortages of human and entrepreneurial 
capital to keep the country’s economy running.33 
The weakness of follow-up mechanisms of the government investment program must be 
pointed out, reflecting the difficulty of following-up the donor programs. 
Both the World Bank and the (UN) have carried out several attempts to evaluate the 
performance of each of the two funds, in addition to the recent joint performance evaluation 
study submitted to the donor’s conference in Naples. But in reality, Iraq has not sensed any 
fundamental change in the way of project formulation, particularly by the (UN) organizations. 
  
                                                          
32 Abed Al-wahab Homed the expatriation of the scientific competences, law magazine, Kuwait, no 4 1999, p 16 
33 Economic Doldrums in Iraq, Council on Foreign Relations, June 20, 2007:  
http://www.cfr.org/publication 
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VII. SUMMARY AND CONCLUSION 
Summary 
     In this study I began examines the success and failure of the Iraqi Infrastructure 
Reconstruction Fund. To do this effectively I first looked at the problem to the difficulties 
associated with the administration of the fund. I then examined where the fund succeeded and 
failed of the Iraqi Infrastructure Reconstruction efforts. From data made available from Iraqi 
ministry of planning, and Development Assistance Database (DAD), and International 
Reconstruction Fund Facility for Iraq (IRFFI), I have reached several preliminary 
observations of the Reconstruction efforts.  
1. In spite of a large amount of international donations, made of Iraqi’s infrastructure remains 
unrepaired. The people in Iraq, for instance, no electricity,   water supply, Security, 
healthcare, education, transportation,…etc. 
2. Why has this slow progress (failure) occurred? There are several complex reasons that 
underline the administration of the reconstruction fund. One such difficulty is lack of security 
and political instability, administration fragmentations, inefficient administrative on all levels, 
mismanagement and corruption. 
 
 
 
38 
Conclusion 
     With reference to the above on the management and distribution of international aid 
and the features of Iraq experience, it can be said that the situation in Iraq is not peculiar to 
the global experience, and joint efforts are needed to increase aid effectiveness in Iraq. This 
requires strong political will from the government side to deal with the international 
community in a way that insures the precedence of national interest over narrow regional and 
political ones. On the hand, donors are to review their policies governing aid provision with 
adaptation to the Iraqi context and the special aspects of the transitional period in Iraq, 
therefore we can conclude: 
Huge sums of money have been spent in projects implemented in Iraq through bilateral and 
multilateral channels, with limited impact due to problems on both the donor and Iraqi sides 
of the equation. 
The stumbling political process , failure  to build capable institutions to carry out tasks of 
reconstructions, inability to establish effective partnership with international partner, in 
addition to insecurity and violence, all these factors have led to the delay and hampering of 
reconstruction and development despite enormous investments of international and national 
resources.  
International aid has not always achieved its intended outcome due to many factors that 
become critical in challenging development contexts such as Iraq. Donor policies are often 
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inconsistent with locally and nationally identified needs in recipient countries. Although the 
management of aid is a shared responsibility between donors and the recipient, most aid is 
only committed when a government is facing a governance crisis, and when institutions are 
ineffective and there is a deterioration of security conditions. This effectively limits the 
potential impact of aid due to the fact that the government is preoccupied with stabilising the 
country. This is in addition to the limited capacity of state institutions to absorb aid and 
actively engaged with the donor institutions in the planning and implementation of aid 
programs. 
The reconstruction effort has not done what it was meant to do. Reconstruction efforts have 
been plagued by poor management, mishandling of reconstruction funds, inadequate 
coordination with Iraqis and widespread attacks on construction sites and contractors as 
documented by the Office of the Special Inspector General for Iraq Reconstruction (SIGIR).  
The (SIGIR) conducts audits, investigations and inspections and issues quarterly reports to 
Congress. The SIGIR reports and (U.S.A) Congressional testimony of Stuart Bowen, the 
Inspector General, are a primary source of information on the overall status of (U.S.A) 
funded Iraq reconstruction. The rate of disbursement of funds administered by the United 
Nations and World Bank has been slow. Iraqi agencies and ministries are often unable to 
receive or process funds. Many United Nations agencies have had great difficulty operating 
in Iraq due to the poor security situation. 
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VIII. RECOMMENDATIONS AND URGENT NEEDS: 
      With reference to the above on the management of international aid and the features 
of Iraq experience, it can be said that the situation in Iraq is not peculiar to the global 
experience, and joint efforts are needed to increase aid effectiveness in Iraq. This requires 
strong political will from the government side to deal with the international community in a 
way that insures the precedence of national interest over narrow regional and political ones. 
On the hand, donors are to review their policies governing aid provision with adaptation to 
the Iraqi context and the special aspects of the transitional period in Iraq, therefore it is 
necessary to develop a number of procedures to address the failures in allocating and 
managing the international grants, given that aid management is a shared responsibility 
between Iraq and the donor community that supposes to lead to better outcome unlike the 
reality in Iraq. 
1. Enhance the political stability, and promote the country unification. 
2. Increase the capacity building of the government, to face the requirements of rebuilding the 
country infrastructure is deeply recommended. 
3. Promote monitoring and auditing skills of the governmental officials. 
4. Review the government strategies and plans for reconstruction, and suggest ways and 
means to ensure the development of single unified program agreed upon all national 
stakeholders, which act as a road map for international community interventions to support 
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Iraq, to ensure consistency with national priorities and complement national resources to 
achieve development. 
5. Insecurity situation which contribute to hinder or slowdown this process. 
6. Establish a mechanism of donor coordination and work jointly with the Iraqi body, 
ensuring transparency, integration, harmony, and alignment with national priorities. 
7. Conduct a comprehensive assessment of donor’s activities in Iraq including bilateral and 
multilateral in cooperation with governmental body, to draw lessons and suggest reforms 
consistent with the transitional phase in Iraq. 
8. Establish a base of continuous dialogue with the international community through laying 
the foundation for partnership and cooperation taking into account emerging Iraqi needs.  
9. Examine and analyses the impact of external aid provided to Iraq since 2003 and draw 
lessons for the next phases of programming. 
10. Develop policy and rules for aid management, as well as objectives of donors' 
interventions to ensure effectiveness and alignment with national priorities. 
11. Set out a decentralized mechanism of management of aid to secure division of 
responsibilities between federal and local entities to avoid duplication and incompatibility. 
12. The country need to set the priorities hence, reconstructing the electricity, the water 
supply systems, the health's networks….etc. 
13. Supporting economic and social transition. 
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